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Small Arms/Light Weapons and  
   Physical Security in Misrata, Libya
During November 2011 DanChurchAid performed a small arms/light weapons field assessment in 
Misrata, Libya. In this article, DCA outlines this assessment and explains why SA/LW risk education 
is a valuable and appropriate response to this situation.
by Adam Forbes [ DanChurchAid ]
The proliferation of small arms and light weapons is a common civil-war legacy, often thought to exacer-bate post-conf lict insecurity and instability within 
a country and beyond its borders.1 SA/LW proliferation is 
a potentially sensitive and dynamic issue for international 
nongovernmental organizations to address; this issue be-
comes more difficult in the immediate aftermath of war and 
major uprisings. 
The 2011 uprising in Libya and the accompanying influx of 
SA/LW into civilian communities prompted DanChurchAid 
to evaluate the SA/LW situation in Libya.2  A recent field 
assessment undertaken by DCA in Misrata determined 
that, within the areas visited and at the time of the assess-
ment, SA/LW were not contributing to insecurity in the po-
litical or criminal sense. However, DCA found that SA/LW 
did represent an immediate threat to personal security and 
should be the legitimate focus of humanitarian efforts to re-
duce the risks to civilians. 
SA/LW in Misrata
Misrata saw some of the heaviest fighting in the 2011 
Libyan uprising. Under the Moammar Gadhafi regime, few 
people were authorized to own small arms apart from some 
hunters and farmers. However, the events of 2011 caused the 
civilian population to acquire a large and unknown number 
of SA/LW via combat, stockpile seizure or the black market. 
At a macro-level, Misrata was secured in late 2011. 
Interviews with authorities and community leaders suggest 
that crime rates are negligible, and the inevitable maneu-
vering of local political factions is peaceful and nonviolent. 
DCA found that a considerable amount of social control ex-
ists to regulate individual behavior around SA/LW and miti-
gate some of the potential negatives of weapons ownership. A 
number of sources pointed to heavy regulation. The brigades, 
known as khatiba, reportedly have a large number of SA/LW. 
One hundred eighty-six brigades of approximately 50 mem-
bers each are registered with the Misrata Military Council. 
During the uprising, prospective weapons owners were re-
quired to enroll with a brigade and register their firearm. This 
data for most, if not all, SA/LW would greatly benefit any fu-
ture attempt to collect and control these weapons. Brigades 
exert some control as they only allow their members to carry 
their weapons “on duty” (e.g., staffing a checkpoint) and they 
plan to centralize members’ SA/LW into stockpiles. 
Religious leaders are another source of control. Speaking 
on radio broadcasts and during Friday prayer, the Imams con-
demned the practice of celebratory gunfire. It is largely due to 
their influence that the practice has become less common; this 
influence was evident by the virtually gunshot-free, public 
celebrations following the death of Mutassim Gadhafi (son 
of Moammar Gadhafi) in October 2011. Lastly, communities 
self-regulate, and if someone fires a weapon in or around a 
home, vocal and forceful criticism ensues, which carries great 
weight in a tight-knit society. 
SA/LW Risk Education
During the assessment DCA found that SA/LW-related in-
cidents threaten physical security in Libya. The results led the 
DCA team to conclude that SA/LW risk education is the most 
appropriate and effective method for organizations to assist 
the transitional authorities and civil society. Future interven-
tions involving physical security and stockpile management in 
Libya need assessment as the context evolves.
SA/LW risk education is based on observing risk-taking be-
havior and forming the appropriate messages to encourage be-
havioral change. These messages are then turned into materials 
(e.g., training curricula, posters or plays, and programs deliv-
ered via radio) and transmitted through a relevant medium (e.g., 
peer-to-peer education, radio broadcast or community leaders). 
Through interviews with civil society, transitional authori-
ties and international NGOs (notably Handicap International), 
DCA found the following examples of risk-taking behavior. 
Statistics are not available, however, because no one, foreign 
or domestic, systematically collects data on SA/LW-related in-
juries in Misrata.
Risk-taking Behavior
Celebratory gunfire. Numerous reports cite people be-
ing wounded and killed during bouts of celebratory gunfire. 
Growing recognition of this danger and the strong advocacy of 
Imams and transitional authorities against the practice signifi-
cantly decreased its frequency.
Mishandling ammunition. In addition to hearing numer-
ous reports, DCA witnessed children playing with ammuni-
tion, fuzes and grenades. Teachers report that children bring 
ammunition to school and try to remove the gunpowder. 
Ammunition is often thrown into fires for its explosive effect. 
Only a few days prior to this assessment, a young girl was se-
riously injured because her brother was playing in this way.
People are holding onto SA/LW for multiple reasons: for protection, as trophies and to mitigate uncertainty over the future.
Children are at risk from small arms and light weapons. 
They are naturally curious and do not know they should 
not touch weapons.
All photos of courtesy of Paul Jeffrey.
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Alcohol-induced misuse. Judiciary authorities stated that 
of 10 incidents of post-conflict shootings currently under le-
gal investigation, seven involve alcohol. On 25 October 2011, 
a drunk man killed a khatiba member at a checkpoint in the 
Kasar Ahmed district. In another case, neighbors entered into 
a violent dispute with a hero of the uprising who repeatedly 
shot into the air when intoxicated. Neighbors killed the man 
because he was dangerous.
Children playing with small arms. Firearms, unless se-
curely stored, represent a particular threat to curious children. 
Grenades and other explosive devices pose a threat to the en-
tire household regardless of how they are stored. While many 
men insisted they knew of and practiced safe-storage tech-
niques, the majority of women interviewed believed their hus-
bands and older sons were still unfamiliar with firearms and 
said the men frequently left weapons unattended and load-
ed. Notably, some households lack appropriate storage con-
tainers. Reports of accidents are rare but occur nonetheless. 
Although parents undoubtedly tell their children not to touch 
SA/LW, a discrepancy exists between safety messages and a 
wider culture in which weapons are celebrated as a means of 
defense and of defeating the regime. This is evidenced in tele-
vision, public events and public discourse in general.
Local Outreach
As described previously, individuals, civil society and 
transitional authorities in Libya are already active in con-
trolling SA/LW misuse. DCA will continue to assist local au-
thorities, governments and NGOs as they work to mitigate 
risk-taking behavior among civilians through a variety of ca-
pacities, including:
Imams. Imams in Misrata are organized through the 
Council of Mosques (Al awkaf ). The current leader, Sheikh 
Ahmed Dowa, met with DCA and has the authority to 
guide the content of the sermon at Friday prayers across all 
Mosques in the city. Thousands of male adults and children 
hear these prayers. Based on the successful work of imams 
to discourage celebratory shooting, the Council of Mosques 
is keen to work with DCA to deliver a wider range of risk-
education messages.
Teachers. State schoolteachers and Koranic schoolteachers 
are excellent influencers of children’s behavior and subsequent-
ly, their parents’ behavior. DCA is working with schoolteach-
ers to help provide psychosocial support to conflict-affected 
children and will build upon this initiative and network.
Radio stations. Radio broadcasts are highly influential 
and respected. Regular programs and drama sketches address 
the problem of celebratory shooting. The main station, Radio 
Misrata, operated throughout the conflict, and Gadhafi forces 
regularly attacked it due to its credibility with the local popu-
lation. Interviews with women suggested that radio is perhaps 
the best medium for reaching mothers and wives who spend 
much of their time at home and are considered to be respon-
sible for the home. Therefore, women have a key role to play in 
ensuring that weapons are stored safely. 
Khatiba members. Misrata society honors as heroes the 
predominantly young, volunteer fighters from the uprising. 
They have a profound effect on teen and child behavior and 
are very aware of this fact. One member told DCA that “if chil-
dren see us smoking, then they will smoke too.” Many khati-
ba members have a negative view of SA/LW after seeing many 
friends killed or injured, which differs to some extent from 
older men who may have acquired a firearm for protection 
but did not witness such fighting. DCA will seek to mobilize a 
number of khatiba members to deliver SA/LW risk-education 
messages in schools, at parent-teacher evenings and elsewhere. 
Khatiba members display a strong sense of responsibility for 
the new Libya and expressed interest in this activity.
Military Council and Security 
Council. At the time of the assess-
ment, the Military Council and 
Security Council were the most tan-
gible forms of authority followed by the 
National Transitional Council. DCA 
met with leaders of both councils who 
DCA found to be ready and willing to 
speak on radio programs and through 
other media to deliver SA/LW risk-edu-
cation messages.
Local NGOs. Prior to the conflict, 
only two NGOs existed in Misrata: the 
Boy Scouts and the Red Crescent. They 
are now joined by a burgeoning number 
of NGOs and associations with vary-
ing levels of capacity, activity and orga-
nization. The Boy Scouts organization 
is active in mine-risk education and 
will soon begin work with Handicap 
International on SA/LW risk educa-
tion. The Red Crescent works with the 
International Committee of the Red 
Cross on, inter alia, MRE. The newer 
NGOs often respond to the effects of 
the conflict on vulnerable people, par-
ticularly children. Local NGOs are a 
good source for delivering messages to 
Group Level of risk awareness Category Sample messages
1 Unaware Children Similar to Mine Risk Education – don’t touch etc
2 Aware of risk, unaware 
of appropriate safe 
behavior
• Older children
• Teenagers
• Adults unfamiliar 
with weapons 
• Some weapons-
owning males
• Never point a weapon at anyone
• Always assume that a weapon is loaded and 
dangerous
• Never touch the trigger unless you have thought 
exactly about what you are shooting and why you are 
doing it
• Make sure your weapon is locked away and 
inaccessible to children
• Separate ammunition from weapon
3 Aware of risk and safe 
behavior but choose to 
ignore
• Teenagers
• Weapons-owning 
males
• There is no point keeping a weapon in your house to 
protect your family if that weapon only makes them 
more afraid
• People fought and died to build a new Libya. 
Wouldn’t you rather protect yourself from weapons in 
order to enjoy this new future?
Table 1. At-risk groups for excess SA/LW and samples of mine-risk education messages.
Children are particularly vulnerable to the excess of SA/LW 
in Libya.
women as well. By training local NGOs 
in SA/LW risk-education methods, 
DCA will complement existing com-
munity outreach programs to empower 
women with safety advice.
Conclusion
Contrary to the experience of many 
post-conflict settings, SA/LW did not 
present a threat to security in terms of 
crime or political stability in Misrata, 
Libya at the time of this assessment. 
However, SA/LW constituted a consid-
erable threat to personal security, which 
Libyan civil society, authorities and me-
dia have recognized. While the scope of 
this assessment did not include other 
areas of the country, anecdotal evidence 
suggests that the situation is similar in 
Benghazi and, to a lesser extent, Tripoli. 
The immediate role of DCA and other 
international actors is to help Libya and 
its elected authorities mitigate the risk of 
SA/LW in this transitional period and 
beyond, whether SA/LW are subject to 
disarmament, regulated ownership or a 
combination of both. This is a humanitar-
ian endeavor in every sense and follows 
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the mine-action mission to remove the 
explosive remnants of war, so that survi-
vors may enjoy peace. As one Libyan 
journalist noted, “What good is freedom 
if one is not safe to enjoy it?” 
See endnotes page 81
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